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<A>ABSTRACT1 
This article examines violence against detainees in British-controlled detention facilities in 
southeast Iraq from 2003 to 2008. I argue that various legal frameworks, domestic and 
international, failed to protect Iraqi detainees from violence while in British custody. Law 
could not penetrate the thick culture of impunity surrounding security force actions in Iraq. 
This is linked to obstacles in securing the ‘truth’ about violent assault, death and degradation 
in these detention facilities. I examine patterns of violence, particularly harmful pre-
interrogation techniques originally employed in Northern Ireland, subsequently banned by 
the UK government, only to reemerge in British detention facilities in Iraq. I argue that a 
culture of impunity surrounds these abuses, which does not lend itself to an open 
accounting, raising the question of whether the International Criminal Court will be able to 
prise open a space for an investigation of the facts without fear or favour. 
 
<A>Keywords: southeast Iraq, British detention facilities, culture of impunity, pre-
interrogation techniques 
 
<A>INTRODUCTION 
Extrajudicial detention creates optimal conditions for the emergence of detainee abuse and 
violence. A ‘thick description’ of abuses that occurred in British detention facilities in 
southeast Iraq aims to develop an understanding of this violence. The geospatial 
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architecture of detention ensures detainee submission to camp authorities, who act as 
proxy agents of the state.2 Whereas arbitrary detention challenges some of the foundational 
precepts of the democratic state, local ordinances, regulations and military orders give the 
detaining institution and its associated techniques a mantle of legitimacy, and the violence 
becomes invisible. Periodic outbursts or acts of aggression in sites of detention are 
generally portrayed as aberrant in the face of this invisible violence. To appreciate the 
violence of the camp in its totality, it is necessary to recognize the symbolic violence of 
language and law and the quiet systemic violence that accompanies the architecture of 
detention. 
I argue that the violent framework of detention is sustained by an underlying culture of 
impunity. Whilst detention without trial makes individuals more vulnerable to violence, 
abuses and violations that occur in these sites have proven extremely difficult to prosecute, 
due to political and structural obstacles and the ‘consequences of the smooth functioning’ of 
emergency law regulatory frameworks.3 What emerges from the assessment is that 
protections and standards for security internees, whether drawn from international 
humanitarian law, international human rights law, military or municipal laws, largely failed in 
Iraq, and this failure is intimately related to detainee mistreatment. I start by examining the 
constitutional and military context in which the British army acted as a detaining authority in 
Iraq. I then examine accounts that have emerged regarding physical violence in sites of 
detention and detail the deaths that occurred in British custody. Thereafter, through 
reference to domestic proceedings, I identify an accountability deficit for violence that 
occurred in British sites of detention in Iraq. I argue that serious deficits with such 
proceedings have failed to make the situation inadmissible before the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), and that the prosecutor has a legitimate basis to reopen the preliminary 
examination into the matter. Whilst the UK may not be a transitional society emerging from 
conflict, it was involved in the ‘transformative occupation’ of Iraq and during that occupation 
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abuses occurred that have ramifications for international justice, peace and security.4 
Indeed, the progress of this case through the machinery of the ICC may help address long-
standing criticisms regarding the political and geographical bias of the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) with respect to selecting cases for the Court.5 In this context, exemplary 
prosecutions may inculcate a sense of justice at the international level, acknowledging past 
wrongs and the ‘seeming subordination of third world states to the same international 
institutions that appear weak in the face of powerful states.’6 This could shore up the 
Court’s legitimacy with a powerful message: that no one who commits ‘serious crimes of 
concern to the international community’ within the Court’s jurisdiction is above the law.7 
 
<A>CONSTITUTIONAL–MILITARY CONTEXT OF BRITISH DETENTION IN IRAQ (2003–
2008) 
Between 1 May 2003 and 28 June 2004, a US–UK coalition occupied Iraq and was bound 
by international humanitarian law rules and standards regarding the occupation. Once a 
belligerent occupier is in effective control of the territory, certain duties and obligations are 
assigned. The occupying forces must take measures ‘to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country.’8 Outrages on personal dignity, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment 
are prohibited by customary humanitarian law applicable both in situations of international 
and noninternational armed conflict.9 In assuming the role of occupier, the US and the UK 
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created a temporary governance structure, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).10 
Additionally, a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution, formulated under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, recognized the commitments set out by the CPA ‘as occupying powers under a 
unified command,’ and called upon the states involved to fully comply with their 
international law obligations, in particular the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.11 The first regulation passed by the CPA affirmed the caretaker 
administration’s mandate to restore peace and security in Iraq, and to create conditions 
conducive to the reconstruction and development of the country. Section 2 of the regulation 
confirmed that Iraqi laws in force on 16 April 2003 would be respected, but if these laws 
conflicted with the CPA’s mandate, the law-making powers of the latter would prevail.12 In a 
statement regarding its legislative and executive capacities, the CPA referenced Resolution 
1483 and reiterated a commitment to act according to ‘the laws and usages of war.’13  
Multinational forces (MNFs) on the ground enacted the CPA agenda. The coalition 
forces had six divisions, four under the command of the US army; the remaining two were 
multinational. Assuming control of Multinational Division South East, over 8,000 British 
troops were deployed to the 60,000 square mile area, which had a population of 4.6 million 
people. Whilst the southeast division covered four provinces (Al-Basrah, Maysan, Thi Qar 
and Al-Muthanna), British operations mainly centred in Al-Basrah and Maysan.14 The 
authority to intern civilians stemmed from the Fourth Geneva Convention. Security-related 
internment was further endorsed by UNSC Resolution 1546, authored under Chapter VII. 
Adopted on 8 June 2004, it welcomed the end of the formal occupation and the 
establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government, which assumed full authority on 28 June 
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2004. It also pointed out that the MNF remained in Iraq at the request of the interim Iraqi 
government and two letters detailing this arrangement were annexed to the resolution.15 
One letter, written by the US secretary of state and addressed to the president of the 
UNSC, outlined some of the measures to be taken by the MNF: 
Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a 
broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force 
protection. These include activities necessary to counter on-going security threats 
posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will 
include combat operations against members of these groups, internment where this is 
necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and 
securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security.16  
The language of internment for ‘imperative reasons of security’ is drawn from Article 
78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, so while the country was transitioning from a situation 
of occupation covered by international humanitarian law, Colin Powell restated the US 
government’s commitment to work within that same legal framework. He assured the UNSC 
that the MNF would adhere to the laws of armed conflict, which would be critical to the 
success of the mission in his estimation. Individual state parties contributing to the MNF 
were reminded that they had to exercise ‘jurisdiction over their personnel.’17 In British-
controlled detention facilities, this signalled jurisdiction to prosecute violations of 
humanitarian law, service law,18 war crimes and crimes against humanity through the 2001 
International Criminal Law Act, domestic criminal law,19 and, although this was subject to 
debate at the time, violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).20 
Additionally, UNSCR 1546 gave the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) a mandate to 
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promote human rights in the country.21 UNAMI reported to the UNSC pursuant to UNSCR 
1546, and in June 2005 it noted with concern that approximately 6,000 detainees were 
being held by MNF without due process and without access to lawyers, in violation of 
international law.22 Earlier, a leaked International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
report highlighted detainee ill-treatment in coalition-run detention facilities. These abuses 
were not isolated to the US Abu Ghraib detention facility and included the mistreatment of 
detainees in British-controlled facilities.23  
A network of detention sites received individuals arrested by UK forces during the 
occupation and continued to receive detainees after the MNF remained in the country at the 
behest of the new Iraqi government. At any given time, the British had one official detention 
facility in operation. The first official site was the Theatre Internment Facility (TIF) at Umm 
Qasr, established in April 2003. When the administration of the TIF transferred to the US 
military on 7 April 2003, it became known as Camp Bucca. However, a ‘shadowy military 
intelligence unit’ of the British army, the Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT), remained 
at the camp while it was under American management.24 On 25 September 2003, the 
British forces resumed administration of the camp. A new facility, the Divisional Temporary 
Detention Facility, opened at Shaibah and all UK detainees were transferred there in 
December 2003.25 The average length of detention at the Shaibah facility was 198 days. 
Detainees had their cases reviewed on a monthly basis by the Divisional Internment 
Review Committee, comprised of British military and intelligence personnel.26 A third official 
site was located near Basra airport – this base succeeded the Shaibah facility in accepting 
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security internees arrested and detained by British forces between 2007 and 2008.27 Before 
being admitted to an official internment centre, detainees were often held at British army 
bases such as Battle-Group Main and Camp Stephen. British forces also had links to Abu 
Ghraib in Baghdad. Security internees and possibly prisoners of war (POWs) arrested by 
the British army after December 2003 were transferred to Abu Ghraib.28 In addition, three 
British personnel from the Army Intelligence Corps were stationed at Abu Ghraib from 
January to April 2004. 
The US–UK military partnership was also reflected in the administration of some 
detention facilities. Mark Urban maintains that UK special forces transferred prisoners to the 
US facility at Camp Nama, located west of Baghdad airport, where abuse was normalized 
and detainees ‘showed signs of having been mistreated (beaten) by their captors.’29 After 
interviewing a suspect at a black site near Balad, the British intelligence agency MI6 raised 
concerns about detainee mistreatment. Consequently, Britain submitted a national caveat 
whereby its forces ‘would not hand over prisoners to the Americans if they were going to be 
detained at the Balad black site.’30 In addition, there was complicity between US and UK 
special forces in managing at least two other secret detention facilities: H1, located at an oil 
pumping station in the desert (precise location unknown), and Station 22, located at a 
phosphate mine near the town of Al-Qaim.31 Both sites were hidden from the ICRC and 
senior legal advisors in the British army. 
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The British had three detainee categories: POWs, security internees and criminal 
detainees.32 British forces held at least 3,000 POWs and 2,000 security internees, although 
the latter figure is likely a conservative estimate.33 POWs were captured during the first 
phase of the conflict and were recognized by an early operational order. Lieutenant Colonel 
Nicholas Mercer, the most senior army legal expert in Iraq, testified at a public inquiry that 
by June 2003 approximately 3,000 POWs had been processed and all but two released.34 
Several directives were issued to remind army officers that handling POWs must be in 
accordance with the laws of armed conflict, in particular the Third Geneva Convention and 
the First Protocol, which stipulates that all such prisoners should be treated humanely and 
given adequate food, water, medical attention, shelter and clothing.35 High-level guidance 
issued to officers emphasized that military operations, including prisoner handling, were to 
be conducted in accordance with the UK’s obligations under international humanitarian law, 
as well as national laws.36 Violence, threats and coercion were prohibited means of 
gathering intelligence; a POW was only obliged to divulge his name, rank and date of birth. 
All POWs had their status confirmed by a competent tribunal, as per Article 5 of the Third 
Geneva Convention.  
When the formal occupation ended, people arrested and held in custody were 
categorized either as ‘security internees’ or ‘criminal detainees.’ Generally, there were two 
sets of circumstances in which arrests by the British military could lead to internment. 
Firstly, through ‘pre-planned lift operations,’ where the targets to be arrested and detained 
were identified in advance of the military operation. Alternatively, the internment of suspects 
sometimes occurred as a byproduct of military operations on the ground. Once arrested, 
the individual was considered a ‘detainee’ prior to further assessment, at which point he or 
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she would be deemed a ‘criminal detainee’ or a ‘security internee.’37 Criminal detainees 
were individuals suspected of involvement in criminal activities. From the outset these 
detainees were transferred to the custody of the Royal Military Police (RMP), but from 1 
June 2003 onwards, when domestic capacities improved, the Iraqi police force began to 
accept criminal detainees. Security internees were civilians deemed to be a threat to the 
coalition forces. They were interned according to procedures established in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949.   
An aide-mémoire containing instructions on internment procedures was issued to all 
brigade and battalion commanders. Moreover, it reminded commanders of the occupying 
powers’ obligations towards civilians, ‘including in respect of the practice of their religion, 
avoiding discrimination, and protection from violence, insults and public curiosity.’38 Various 
standing orders and directives were issued relating to internment. The general procedure 
established that detainees were first to be brought before the army’s military police, who 
decided whether the individual should be released or sent to the TIF for questioning, or, if a 
criminal suspect, transferred to the appropriate authority. The arresting officers had one to 
two hours to transfer the individual to the TIF following arrest, or six hours in exceptional 
cases. Significant changes were introduced to internment procedures through Fragmented 
Order (FRAGO) 29, which came into effect on 5 July 2003. The transfer window from arrest 
to reception at the TIF increased to 14 hours. Instead of military police making the transfer 
decision, a new post, the Battle Group Internment Review Officer (BGIRO), was created. It 
was staffed by an individual who was sometimes a member of the capturing party and had 
little or no training.39 It was clear from an earlier order, FRAGO 163, that security internees 
were not supposed to be interrogated prior to transfer to the TIF. However, FRAGO 29 
blurred the lines as to what was permissible at battle group level. During a public inquiry 
into a custodial death, the Ministry of Defence admitted that the extraction of intelligence by 
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tactical questioners may have occurred in order to assist the BGIRO’s transfer decision 
under the new system. Such was the violent interrogation culture that resulted in the 
untimely death of a young Iraqi man, Baha Mousa, after 36 hours in British detention. 
 
<A>VIOLENCE IN DETENTION  
In 2010, a group of former Iraqi detainees brought a case (Ali Zaki Mousa & Others) to the 
UK High Court, seeking the establishment of a public inquiry into systematic abuses that 
occurred in up to 14 different British-controlled facilities between 2003 and 2008. At that 
point there were 127 claimants, but, by the time the case came for judicial review in 2013, 
180 statements had been gathered by Public Interest Lawyers (PIL), with hundreds 
forthcoming. Some of these testimonies are represented in the sample of 109 illustrative 
cases compiled in a dossier by the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights 
(ECCHR) and PIL and submitted to the ICC.40 According to these accounts, detainees were 
exposed to racist and homophobic language, and subjected to sexual, cultural and religious 
abuse. These were not random acts. The strategic use of humiliation, combined with 
physical techniques, was designed to erode detainees’ defences to make them compliant 
with the regime and more malleable to interrogation.  
Five pre-interrogation techniques, also known as deep interrogation or interrogation in 
depth, were employed against 14 individuals in Northern Ireland in 1971:41 sleep 
deprivation, exposure to white noise, wall standing, reduced diet and hooding. The 
controversy surrounding their usage led Edward Heath, then prime minister, to announce 
their discontinuation in 1972, a commitment which was later reiterated by the attorney-
general in the context of an interstate complaint made by Ireland against the UK under the 
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ECHR.42 Part I of a 1972 army directive explicitly prohibited the use of such interrogation 
techniques. However, by the late 1990s there had been ‘a gradual loss of doctrine,’ to a 
point where the prohibition was not incorporated into any written military instructions.43 The 
extent to which these methods remained a component of interrogation training within 
intelligence circles in the intervening years remains unclear. However, the joint doctrine 
covering the military operation of Iraq ‘contained no reference to the ban on the use of the 
five techniques.’44 These insidious methods, along with new innovations, percolated into 
British detention facilities in Iraq, euphemistically called ‘conditioning.’ In essence, the 
techniques were used to ‘prolong, maintain or enhance the shock of capture,’ and 
‘conditioning’ ensured that captured individuals ‘would become compliant with the system of 
detention.’45 ‘Harshing,’ where the interrogator gets ‘within an individual’s intimate space’ 
and shouts aggressively at the interrogatee, and humiliation were elements of conditioning. 
In addition, sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, food and water deprivation and stress 
positions were integral to the pre-interrogation ‘softening-up’ process.46  
Hooding was used as a sensory deprivation pre-interrogation tool in Iraq. It had the 
twin effect of prolonging the ‘shock of capture’ and creating a profound sense of 
disorientation that could be exploited during interrogation. A hessian sack was placed over 
the detainee’s head and sometimes goggles and earmuffs were employed, often in 
combination with severe isolation, restricted movement (flexicuffs) and other techniques. 
Out of a sample of 85 former detainees, 34 were allegedly hooded in 59 separate incidents, 
and in one case two detainees were allegedly hooded and tightly handcuffed whilst 
confined in a tent for one month.47 Following advice from Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas 
Mercer and debate between officers at the National Contingent Headquarters (NCHQ), 
verbal orders were issued by the NCHQ commander and the general officer commanding 
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the 1st (UK) Division between 1 and 3 April, banning the use of hoods in theatre.48 Mercer 
issued FRAGO 152, which was the only written instruction prior to Mousa’s death 
prohibiting the use of hoods.49 At the same time, there were difficulties with the way the ban 
was communicated. It was not consistently implemented and the role of hooding in Mousa’s 
death was highlighted in a subsequent public inquiry. Fifty cases of hooding are alleged to 
have occurred after Mousa’s death.50 The hot desert climate of southeast Iraq, combined 
with stress postures and temperature manipulation, further aggravated the impact of 
hooding and the conditioning techniques on individual detainees. 
Stress postures included forced kneeling in the sun, prolonged standing and 
maintaining specific sitting postures. Sustained wall standing was one of the five techniques 
utilized in Northern Ireland. Arguably, the ‘ski’ or ‘chair’ position characteristic of British 
methods in Iraq was far more painful. In 2006, the UN special rapporteur on torture 
asserted that forcing detainees to ‘maintain uncomfortable positions, such as sitting, 
squatting, lying down, or standing for long periods of time,’ amounted to torture.51 A video 
recording, known as the ‘House of Payne’ within British military circles, shows Corporal 
Donald Payne abusing Mousa and several other detainees, who were forced to maintain 
the ‘ski position’: their backs against the wall, legs bent in a semi-squatting position, with 
cuffed hands extended at a 90-degree angle, all while blindfolded. Mercer witnessed 
individuals squatting and kneeling in the ‘burning’ Iraqi sun on a visit to the JFIT between 28 
and 29 March 2003:  
as I passed the JFIT, I saw approximately forty prisoners kneeling or squatting in 
the sand (in lines) with their arms cuffed high behind their backs with bags on 
their heads.52  
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Mercer wrote to his commanding officer and warned him that such methods were in 
violation of international law, leading to Major Robin Brims issuing a prohibition on 3 April 
2003.53 
Food and water deprivation was another element of detainee conditioning in Iraq. Of 
a representative sample of 109 claimants, 33 alleged food deprivation and 68 claimed that 
they were refused water or given inadequate amounts of water.54 The consequences of this 
were extremely serious in Iraq. Although the body can go for some days without food, it 
starts ‘to burn fat and muscle relatively quickly and cannot last longer than a few hours 
without water in normal temperatures without suffering ill-effects.’55 Without a sufficient 
intake of water, the body is unable to flush out a blood enzyme that builds up as a result of 
bruising and beatings. Water deprivation probably contributed to the renal damage 
experienced by Mousa and other detainees.56  
Sleep deprivation was refined as a British counterinsurgency interrogation method in 
the 1950s and 1960s, but may have had earlier origins as an element of the ‘special 
treatment’ given to a select number of British fascists during World War II.57 
Contemporaneous to its use by British intelligence services, laboratory studies were 
conducted by pioneers of sleep medicine. These studies demonstrated that severe 
psychological effects could be elicited rapidly in sleep-deprived subjects.58 In Iraq, sleep 
deprivation was used to enhance the results of interrogation. For example, a logbook 
recording the movement of detainees has the following entry: ‘TQ [tactical questioner] 
request 987 + 984 be kept awake till 0400 then 0800 onwards.’ There are also several 
references to ‘Operation Wideawake’: ‘Op wide awake conducted using white light.’59 In the 
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Kvočka case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Court 
concluded that sleep deprivation is a method of torture.60  
An argument presented by the applicants in R (Mousa) v. Secretary of State for 
Defence was that the sheer volume of statements collated pointed to widespread and 
systemic abuse.61 The Court ruled against establishing an inquiry, but concluded that 
because the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) was mandated to examine systemic 
issues, it was reasonable to await the findings of IHAT investigations. Regarding the Mousa 
inquiry, the Court found that it might ‘have a substantial bearing on the extent to which the 
systemic issues alleged in the present proceedings require further independent 
investigation.’62 The Court grossly overestimated the extent to which systemic issues could 
be analyzed by the Mousa inquiry, which was demarcated by narrow terms of reference 
that precluded an examination of allegations beyond the incident itself. In the dossier 
forwarded to the ICC, an argument pertaining to the systematic nature of abuses is 
advanced, perhaps with a view to establishing jurisdiction for war crimes ‘committed as part 
of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’63 In a sample of 
85 cases, virtually all the individuals complained of physical beatings, totalling 162 
incidents.64 There were 77 further allegations of punching and 92 of kicking. There were 
certain points at which detainees were particularly vulnerable to this violence, such as 
during the initial arrest. Several former detainees reported being beaten in their homes, in 
front of their families or immediately outside their houses. This trend continued in military 
vehicles en route to detention facilities, and violence was also associated with 
interrogations and the enforcement of stress positions. 
The Mousa inquiry report concludes that most, if not all, detainees held with Mousa at 
the Temporary Detention Facility (TDF) were ‘victims of serious abuse and mistreatment by 
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soldiers.’65 Notably, a number of soldiers revealed that they had witnessed detainees being 
abused at the TDF. One soldier observed that Donald Payne, the provost corporal in 
charge of the detention facility, singled out Kifah Matairi for particular abuse.66 Matairi 
developed acute renal failure as a result and a medical examination one week after his 
release from the TDF revealed evidence of 28 separate injuries on his body.67 Three other 
soldiers confirmed that Payne had demonstrated the ‘choir’ or ‘chorus,’ which involved 
arranging the detainees in a row and kicking each one in succession so that he would 
‘sing.’68 Furthermore, Private Lee Graham stated that ‘due to the repeated nature of these 
kicks, always to the same area on the sides of the prisoners, I’d describe his treatment of 
these prisoners amounted to torture.’69 In a BBC documentary about the incident, a soldier 
(whose identity was concealed) described the detainees after 36 hours of captivity as 
‘whimpering and shaking’ and unable to cope with the abuse, which was ‘torture as far as 
I’m concerned.’70  
In assessing whether the Mousa incident was a ‘one off,’ the inquiry examined other 
1st Queen’s Lancashire Regiment (QLR) subunits, including the A, B and C Companies. 
The Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of the RMP impounded Private Stuart Mackenzie’s 
diary during their investigation into the killing. Mackenzie was a member of the Rodger’s 
Multiple, a subunit of A Company, and his diary lists a litany of abuses meted out on Iraqi 
civilians by the subunit as they carried out their duties in and around Basra.71 The entries 
reveal that at least 17 civilians were assaulted or mistreated over a three-month period. 
Five soldiers and one officer are implicated in the incidents. Other members of the Rodgers 
Multiple confirmed the general patterns of violence depicted in the diary, and some 
corroborated specific events detailed therein.  
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In contrast to the High Court’s assertion that the inquiry might be able to reach some 
conclusions about the wider systemic issues surrounding the Mousa incident, Sir William 
Gage, chair of the inquiry, was unwilling to analyze ‘satellite issues and events’ as these 
were, in his estimation, only of ‘slender relevance to the main issues in the Inquiry.’72 He 
conceded, however, that the events surrounding Mousa’s death were not a ‘one off’ and 
concluded that  
in my opinion, although they [the other incidents] show that the incident involving 
the Op Salerno Detainees [Baha Mousa detainees] was not an isolated incident, 
they do not demonstrate that such disciplinary failures were so widespread 
throughout 1 QLR as to amount to an entrenched culture of violence in the 
Battlegroup.73  
However, the inquiry’s narrow terms of reference do not lend themselves to such a 
finding. In any event, a cursory examination of all the incidents reported to the inquiry 
involving scores of detainees raises another possible interpretation: that violence 
underpinned administrative detention practices, and even if not all service personnel were 
directly responsible for that violence, it was not considered unusual and did not merit 
reporting. Aside from Payne’s conviction for ‘inhuman treatment’ in connection with Mousa’s 
killing, no criminal accountability for torture, inhuman treatment or wilfully causing suffering 
or serious injury to body or health has been established through the meaningful prosecution 
of military offenders, including military commanders who bear responsibility for the criminal 
actions of subordinates that they fail to prevent or punish, as per Article 28 of the Rome 
Statute. Occasionally, detention violence reached a threshold of severe assault and death 
in custody. 
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<A>DEATHS IN CUSTODY 
Article 2 of the ECHR protects the right to life of everyone within the state party’s territory. 
There are two limbs to Article 2: firstly, a substantive prohibition on violating the right to life 
(with exceptions listed), and secondly, a procedural limb elaborated by European Court 
jurisprudence that places a duty on states to effectively investigate Article 2 violations. The 
extent to which the application of domestic and international standards failed in Iraq will be 
examined through the prism of several contentious deaths that occurred in British detention. 
Approximately a dozen people died while in British custody in Iraq, but the prosecution of 
soldiers responsible for these deaths has proven extremely difficult. Mousa’s killing resulted 
in a slew of legal claims and inquiries in different jurisdictions, such as an ineffective SIB 
investigation, court martial proceedings against seven soldiers, High Court litigation, a 
submission to the European Court of Human Rights, a costly public inquiry and an out-of-
court settlement through a civil lawsuit.74 That said, very little criminal accountability has 
been achieved: only one man, Payne, was convicted and received a custodial sentence for 
the killing.75 Payne pleaded guilty to ‘inhuman treatment,’ a war crime defined by Section 
51(1) of the UK’s ICC Act 2001, and the manslaughter charge was dropped.76 Signalling 
deficits in command responsibility, Major Michael Peebles and Colonel Jorge Mendonça 
were charged with negligence in the performance of their duties under the Army Act 1955. 
Unfortunately, charges against all the men other than Payne were abandoned, because, in 
Justice Stuart McKinnon’s estimation, evidence was being withheld due to ‘a more or less 
obvious closing of ranks.’77 Given the passage of time, it is now unlikely that any other 
soldier will be prosecuted for Mousa’s killing. It is arguable as to whether this situation 
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demonstrates the UK government’s unwillingness to prosecute international crimes, thus 
giving rise to ICC jurisdiction under the complementarity principle.78 
The IHAT was tasked with investigating approximately a dozen other suspicious 
deaths that occurred in British custody, which remain unresolved. One case relates to the 
killing of Tariq Sabri al-Fahdawi, who was allegedly beaten to death while aboard a Royal 
Air Force (RAF) Chinook helicopter on 11 April 2003. Sabri was apparently one of 64 
detainees being transported to a detention site known as H1, located at a ‘desert oil 
pumping station’ in western Iraq, outside the British area of operations.79 An RAF 
investigation was launched two months after Sabri’s death and another 10 months elapsed 
before a decision was made on whether his body should be exhumed for a postmortem.80 A 
pathologist advised RAF investigators that such an examination would be worthless due to 
the body’s advanced state of decomposition. The investigation was consequently 
abandoned. However, a leading forensic pathologist disputed this opinion, concluding that 
‘the examination could still reveal evidence of an assault, particularly if any ribs or facial 
bones had been damaged.’81 A leaked RAF report revealed that prisoners on the helicopter 
‘were assaulted while they were handcuffed, hooded, and were knelt on if they “refused to 
adopt the required position”.’82 There were two distinct legal services operating in Iraq, the 
Army Legal Services with its own chain of command, and the Ministry of Defence Legal 
Advisers (MODLA), composed of civilian lawyers that take precedence in a situation of war. 
The latter agency controlled the inquiry into Sabri’s death, but it was ‘highly irregular’ for 
MODLA, which was neither impartial nor independent, to have taken charge of an 
investigation of this nature.83 Ian Cobain suggests that the Ministry of Defence interfered in 
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the case because Sabri was being transported to an illegal detention site under the joint 
management of US and UK forces, but concealed from the ICRC and British Army Legal 
Services.84  
In another case, British soldiers mistakenly arrested Radhi Nama at his home in May 
2003. Nama was taken to Camp Stephen, where he was reportedly ‘softened up’ for 
interrogation. Within hours of arriving at the base, Nama was dead. His death certificate, 
signed by someone without the appropriate medical qualification, indicated that the cause 
of death was cardiac failure. The RMP subsequently concluded that he had died of natural 
causes.85 Recently, IHAT confirmed that the RMP investigation into Nama’s death had not 
been ‘sufficiently thorough’ and was thus ‘incomplete.’86 IHAT reached a similar conclusion 
regarding the case of Jabbar Kareem Ali, a 55-year-old schoolteacher arrested with his son 
in May 2003, who also died at Camp Stephen.87 In a separate incident, three members of 
the Irish Guards and one Coldstream Guard were court-martialled in connection with the 
death of 15-year-old Ahmed Jabber Kareem, arrested on suspicion of looting. Kareem was 
beaten and taken in a British military vehicle to the fast-flowing Shatt al-Basra canal, where 
he was forced into the water at gunpoint and drowned. At the court martial in Colchester, 
Judge Michael Hunter concluded that the soldiers could not be found guilty of manslaughter 
on a legal technicality.88 Following is a wider discussion of attempts to secure domestic 
accountability for abuses in Iraq. 
 
<A>DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY? 
British military investigators examining deaths that occurred in British custody in southeast 
Iraq should have been familiar with three main bodies of law: military standards and orders 
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in theatre regarding the conduct of such investigations; common law standards for 
investigating deaths in custody; and international humanitarian, international criminal law 
and international human rights law obligations.89 In-theatre standing orders issued by 
Brigadier William Moore on 21 June 2003 gave the SIB of the RMP a mandate to 
investigate the use of force outside the normal rules of engagement that resulted in death 
or serious injury.90 Having a separate command structure independent to the regular army, 
the SIB seemed the most appropriate provost organization to pursue these investigations. 
Moore amended the investigatory model in July 2003, when responsibility for triggering 
lethal force investigations shifted to the soldier’s commanding officer. As brigade 
commander, Moore reserved the power to instigate an investigation if he was dissatisfied 
with the commanding officer’s report. However, pressure was brought to bear on the British 
army due to a number of controversial cases ‘in which Iraqis had been killed by the security 
forces.’91 In response, the commander of Multinational Division (South East) introduced a 
new policy that restored investigative control to the SIB. Furthermore, the stipulation that 
the rules of engagement had to be violated was removed, to the effect that ‘all shooting 
incidents involving United Kingdom forces which resulted in a civilian being killed or injured 
[were] to be investigated by the Special Investigation Branch.’92 A veto power to suspend 
the investigation was delegated to the brigade commander, but this could only be exercised 
in exceptional circumstances. Modes of inquiry marked by a lack of independence may be 
relevant to the Pre-Trial Chamber when ruling on the admissibility of the petition before the 
ICC. 
A detailed military doctrine relating to the treatment of POWs and detainees was 
published in 2006.93 The manual explains the core military responsibilities regarding such 
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issues as prisoner handling, the categorization of prisoners and the duties of the protecting 
power, but contains very little information about the investigatory standards that should be 
adhered to when dealing with death-in-custody cases. Cursory references are made to 
some procedural requirements, such as preserving the crime scene, taking statements and 
liaising with family and media, but the manual omits any reference to the relevant bodies of 
law that ought to frame these investigations. The common law duty to investigate a death in 
custody is overlooked, and although there is a perfunctory reference to international human 
rights law standards, international humanitarian law and international criminal law 
obligations are neglected. 
During the military occupation (20 March–28 June 2004), detainees were protected 
persons for the purposes of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Third Convention 
stipulates that an official inquiry ‘must be held by the detaining power following the 
suspected homicide of a prisoner of war.’94 Similarly, Article 131 of the Fourth Convention 
delineates the duties of the detaining power vis-à-vis protected persons. Investigatory and 
prosecutorial obligations may be found elsewhere in international humanitarian law for 
grave breaches of the Conventions, including the ‘wilful killing of protected persons.’95 
Although the 2006 manual suggested that human rights standards ‘may’ apply in ‘UK-run 
holding facilities,’ it is questionable whether the investigatory system promulgated in the 
manual could have satisfied the rigorous procedural standards set out by European Court 
jurisprudence on Article 2 of the Convention, or remove ICC jurisdiction through effective 
prosecutions at national level.96 
In Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed 
the extraterritorial application of the ECHR to the geographical areas of Iraq which had 
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been under British control.97 In addition, the Court affirmed that Article 2 obligations 
continue even in the difficult circumstances of conflict, whereby ‘all reasonable steps must 
be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into the alleged 
breaches of the right to life.’98 In reaching its decision, the Court drew from various sources, 
including Philip Alston’s 2006 report ‘Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,’99 a 
decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Case of the Mapiripán 
Massacre,100 specific right-to-life investigatory obligations and relevant European Court 
jurisprudence.101 European case law has elaborated the procedural limb of Article 2 to 
incorporate four important cornerstones: independence, promptness, efficacy and 
accessibility.102 In Al-Skeini, the Court ruled that an ‘independent examination’ ought to be 
accessible to both the victim’s family and the wider public and capable of investigating 
‘broader issues of State responsibility, for the death, including the instructions, training and 
supervision given to soldiers undertaking tasks such as this in the aftermath of the 
invasion.’103 An Article 2 compliant investigation ought to be ‘broad enough’ to allow 
investigators to consider not only the use of lethal force by agents of the state but also ‘all 
the surrounding circumstances,’ including the planning and management of ground 
operations.104 
When considering the second Ali Zaki Mousa (2013) application, Justice Stephen 
Silber ruled that the investigation should include a ‘lessons learned’ mandate, which might 
be able to identify wider systemic issues.105 SIB investigations into deaths that occurred in 
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British custody were marked by huge shortcomings. In a 2008 report, Brigadier Robert 
Aitken attributed the problems that the RMP experienced in the field to the lack of a ‘civilian 
infrastructure.’ Local customs also  
hampered the execution of British standards of justice: in the case of Nadhem 
Abdullah, for instance, the family of the deceased refused to hand over the body 
for forensic examination – significantly reducing the quality of evidence 
surrounding his death.106  
The strategic articulation of ‘local customs’ in this context is a technique of ‘othering,’ 
which creates a disjuncture between actual responsibility for the violence and legal 
accountability. Notwithstanding the ‘local customs’ and the fractured civilian infrastructure 
that the coalition forces inherited, military investigators failed to complete even the most 
rudimentary tasks. Andrew Williams lists a series of problems with the original investigation 
into Mousa’s killing, from failing to preserve the crime scene (even though it was obvious 
that a violent death had occurred), to a delay in interviewing key participants, compiling a 
list of suspects or forming a case on command-chain responsibility.107 These investigative 
possibilities were all ‘in-house,’ and the failure to pursue them cannot be attributed to a lack 
of civilian infrastructure or to local customs. In the second Ali Zaki Mousa application to the 
High Court, Silber had to determine not whether the original investigations were Article 2 
compliant, but whether the IHAT complied with human rights standards.108 
IHAT was established following a Ministry of Defence statement to parliament on 1 
March 2010. Initially, IHAT was mandated with investigating allegations of British security 
force misconduct which occurred between March 2003 and July 2009.109 By December 
2010 the army provost marshal decided that IHAT should investigate the use of lethal force 
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by the security forces in Iraq, including deaths in custody. By 31 December 2015, IHAT had 
assumed responsibility for investigating 283 allegations of unlawful killing and 1,267 cases 
of ill-treatment, although it is not indicated what percentage of each category occurred in 
detention.110 In 2011 the High Court raised questions regarding the structural and practical 
independence of IHAT, leading to a massive system overhaul.111 Thereafter, the three main 
functions of IHAT were articulated as investigative, prosecutorial and reporting on wider 
systemic issues. 
Notwithstanding these structural reforms, the Ali Zaki Mousa claimants maintained 
that the restructured body still did not meet ECHR standards for effectively investigating 
death in custody cases. Whilst Silber found IHAT to be adequately independent in its 
reconstituted form, it was not fit for the purpose of investigating suspicious death cases. In 
fulfilment of its Article 2 obligations, the government needs to establish a  
full, fair and fearless investigation accessible to the victim’s families and to the 
public into each death, which must look into and consider the immediate and 
surrounding circumstances in which each of the deaths occurred.112  
Silber cited common law and international law standards for investigating deaths in 
custody and affirmed the extended jurisdiction of the ECHR to the custody cases.113 The 
Court found that IHAT failed to satisfy its Article 2 obligations, particularly due to delays in 
its proceedings. Moreover, IHAT was not accessible to the public or to victims’ families, and 
the Court noted that the director of Service Prosecutions was not engaged in decision 
making on prosecutions.114 Indeed, the divisional court ruled that due to its lack of 
independence, ‘an inquisitorial inquiry modelled on a coroner’s inquest’ should be 
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established for fatality cases and should be accessible to families of the deceased, 
therefore satisfying one criterion of an Article 2 compliant investigation.115 However, as this 
mechanism, the Iraq Fatality Investigations (IFI), only considers cases after IHAT and the 
director of Service Prosecutions have concluded that ‘there is no realistic case for 
prosecution,’ it cannot discharge criminal liability for international crimes.116 
 
<A>INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Currently there are 124 state parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute. The UK signed the Statute 
in 1998 and became a state party when it entered into force on 4 October 2001. William 
Schabas notes that the OTP received almost 2,000 communications within its first three 
years of operation, but approximately 80 percent were deemed to be outside the Court’s 
jurisdiction.117 The OTP must decide whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation, whether the case will be admissible before the Court and if it is in the interests 
of justice to proceed with the matter.118 The first petition arising from the situation in Iraq was 
deemed inadmissible by the prosecutor in 2006, because it had not met the gravity threshold 
required for a case to be admissible. However, ‘the Statute explicitly contemplates the 
possibility of new facts being submitted,’ which occurred when the prosecutor reopened a 
preliminary examination into the case upon receipt of the PIL/ECCHR dossier in 2014.119 Of 
course, the prosecutor can, acting in proprio motu, select a case for further examination, one 
of three triggering mechanisms through which a case may proceed to the Court (the other 
two being a state party referral or referral through the UNSC). Essentially, for the first time in 
international criminal law, ‘the choice of situations for prosecution is the prerogative of a 
judicial official within the institution and not a political body outside it.’120  
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The parameters of the preliminary examination are such that the prosecutor must first 
consider the issue of jurisdiction, the components of which include subject matter, temporal 
jurisdiction, geophysical jurisdiction and jurisdiction over individuals. Although Iraq is not a 
state party to the Rome Statute, the Court would have jurisdiction with regard to the latter 
criterion (jurisdiction ratione personae) by virtue of the offender(s)’ nationality. In 2006, the 
OTP developed a prosecutorial strategy focusing its efforts on the most serious crimes 
committed by ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or 
organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes.’121 Schabas notes that a connection was 
made between the strategy to focus on senior leaders and the gravity threshold by the Pre-
Trial Chamber in the Thomas Lubanga case, in which the Chamber stated ‘that the gravity 
threshold was intended to ensure that the Court pursued cases only against “the most senior 
leaders” in any given situation under investigation.’122 Pursuing cases only against those 
most responsible is based on the reasoning that such individuals would be best placed ‘to 
stop the commission of those crimes,’ and the gravity threshold is key to maximizing the 
Court’s deterrent effect.123 In the context of the current submission, those ‘most serious 
criminals’ named are Adam Ingram, former defence minister, and Geoff Hoon, former 
defence secretary. Determining their criminal liability would be done if the matter proceeds to 
a full investigation. 
Before deciding whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with a full investigation, 
which must be sanctioned by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the prosecutor must analyze 
admissibility in terms of gravity and complementarity. When elaborating its prosecutorial 
strategy, the OTP stated that relevant factors in determining whether a case meets the 
gravity threshold for further investigation are ‘the scale of the crimes, the nature of the 
crimes, the manner of their commission and their impact.’124 And whilst the prosecutor stated 
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that there was a ‘reasonable basis’ to conclude that war crimes – wilful killing, and torture 
and inhumane treatment125 – had been committed by British troops in Iraq, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo advanced a quantitative notion of gravity, stating that  
4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a limited number of victims of inhuman 
treatment was of a different order than the number of victims found in other 
situations under investigation or analysis by the Office.126   
Moreno-Ocampo referred to the ‘specific gravity threshold’ set down in Article 8(1) of the 
Rome Statute, which notes that the Court will have jurisdiction ‘in respect of war crimes in 
particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission 
of such crimes.’ He then juxtaposed the Iraq case with situations arising from conflicts in 
northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Darfur, a quantitative 
comparative assessment which Schabas has described as ‘flawed’:  
the Prosecutor could not have been comparing the total number of deaths in Iraq 
with the total in the DRC or Uganda, because he might have been forced to 
conclude that the situation in Iraq is more serious … the quantitative analysis of 
gravity, which has a certain persuasive authority, appears to get totally muddled 
in imprecise comparisons.127  
Now that the dossier contains many more killings and hundreds of allegations of torture 
and inhumane treatment, the current prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, will have to tackle the 
quantitative criterion set out by her predecessor to dispel the suggestion that this was a 
politically expedient decision in 2006. Indeed, Bensouda highlighted that the ‘communication 
alleges a higher number of cases of ill-treatment of detainees and provides further details on 
the factual circumstances and the geographical and temporal scope of the alleged crimes.’128 
Other factors that could weigh on a consideration of gravity would be whether the actions 
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were committed by an individual acting on behalf of the state, or whether the crimes occurred 
within the context of a war of aggression. However, a reading of Article 8(1) – which forces a 
higher threshold to war crimes committed ‘in particular as part of a plan or policy or as part of 
a large-scale commission of such crimes’ – that removes the understanding conveyed by the 
words ‘in particular’ could be potentially problematic to the current submission arising from 
Iraq. Due to its decision on gravity in 2006, the prosecutor did not consider the issue of 
complementarity. 
The role of the ICC is to complement rather than displace national courts; a 
‘compromise built into the heart of the ICC system, intended to strike the balance between 
the promotion of international justice and the preservation of state sovereignty.’129 Article 
17(1) of the Rome Statute holds that a case will be rendered admissible before the Court if 
the prosecutor can show that the state in question is ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to carry out the 
ostensible proceedings genuinely. If national proceedings are already underway, ‘the case 
will be admissible only where those efforts cannot be considered genuine.’130 There are 
several aspects to unwillingness, such as state proceedings that are actually an effort to 
shield individuals from criminal responsibility, or unjustified delays in proceedings. With 
respect to due process under international law, the Court may examine whether the 
national proceedings were  
conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in 
a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.131  
The lack of independence of the IHATs was one criticism levelled by the complainants 
in Ali Zaki Mousa (II) (2013). It was sufficiently serious and credible with respect to the 
unlawful killing cases to lead to the establishment of the IFI to satisfy the criteria set out by 
the European Court of Human Rights for investigating Article 2 violations. To date, the IFI 
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has completed investigations of three cases, but without a criminal prosecutorial mandate it 
cannot be said to make these cases inadmissible before the ICC.  
The proliferation of retrospective mechanisms to tackle abuses that occurred in British 
detention facilities in Iraq appears to have atomized or compartmentalized narratives of 
violence, resulting in very little accountability. For example, although several court martials 
were established to investigate allegations of abuse in Iraq, only two resulted in convictions 
and ‘not a single officer has been found guilty of any offence.’132 Indeed, following the 
publication of the Mousa inquiry report, PIL submitted a complaint to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) regarding 25 individual suspects. However, the DPP concluded that 
there was no longer ‘any concern in relation to the further investigation of these matters.’133 
Similar problems are associated with IHAT. An examination of work completed by IHAT to 
date reveals that criminal cases are not being contemplated for various reasons, including 
insufficient evidence, a lack of viable lines of inquiry and failure to meet the standards of 
evidential sufficiency. With no prosecutions flowing from the IFI, it is difficult to see how the 
UK can argue that it is genuinely willing to prosecute international crimes. However, the 
government could point to the attempted prosecutions of other soldiers and officers in the 
Mousa case, and argue that these prosecutions failed not because of a lack of willingness 
on the government’s behalf to prosecute the offenders, but due to the entrenched culture of 
silence within the army that more or less led to a ‘closing of ranks’ with respect to truth 
seeking about the killing.  
 
<A>CONCLUSION 
This article explored the politico-legal architecture of British-controlled detention in southeast 
Iraq. In sum, various legal frameworks, domestic and international, failed to protect Iraqi 
detainees from violence that occurred while in British custody. Law could not penetrate the 
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thick culture of impunity surrounding security force actions in Iraq, and this explains the 
ongoing difficulty faced by those seeking to secure the truth about what happened in these 
detention facilities. To challenge the hegemonic narrative of the state with respect to 
detention is not straightforward, and can leave whistleblowers, victims and their advocates 
vulnerable to state-sanctioned criticism, smear campaigns, prosecutions or other 
proceedings. Indeed, a law firm which represented former Iraqi detainees during the Al-
Sweady public inquiry has been referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, accused of 
misconduct in relation to these cases.134 Whilst one must treat detainee testimony presented 
to the ICC with caution, this can be counterbalanced by the way in which the general trends 
contained therein are consonant with testimonies provided by military witnesses to public 
inquiries and court martials, NGO reports and official documentation. Moreover, there is 
historical precedent to this tendency to cover up detainee abuse. The situation in Iraq bears 
a striking similarity to the manner in which allegations of detainee mistreatment were handled 
in Northern Ireland, and, before that, in the British colonies. Memories of utter powerlessness 
in which detention-based violence occurred may resurface years after the abusive treatment, 
manifested by a recent claim stemming from mid-20th-century Kenyan detention camps, an 
incident litigated in the UK high courts from British Malaya, and the Irish government’s 2014 
application to Strasbourg seeking a reexamination of the European Court’s 1978 judgment 
on the basis that it was incongruent with what the ‘hooded men’ actually experienced in 
Ballykelly. These historical claims exemplify a pressing need to set the record straight. 
Generally, a historical culture of impunity for specific abuses in the past is very difficult to 
overcome, especially if supported by contemporary denials. A culture of impunity does not 
lend itself to an open auditing, which raises the question of whether an international court or 
tribunal could possibly prise open a space where the facts of what occurred in British-
controlled detention facilities in southeast Iraq might be examined without fear or favour. This 
is especially true if one accepts an argument proposed by Schabas that the ICC prosecutor 
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is not above politics and ‘does, in fact, make political choices.’135 The politics of international 
justice weighs against the possibility of arrest warrants being issued for Hoon and Ingram, 
but no doubt these individuals are watching how the prosecutor’s preliminary examination 
progresses with great interest. 
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